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forms throughout the rest of his life� But 
readers be warned: do not invite a moral 
equivalency test between these two 
men� Orwell was a frustrated moralist, 
while Churchill, for all his success, was 
a politician—a man who, for most of 
his life, sought power and its trappings�
There are many great books on Orwell 
and Churchill� If you already have read 
D� J� Taylor’s fine biography of Orwell 
and cracked William Manchester’s 
biography of Churchill, then Ricks’s 
work may seem like tilled soil� Consider, 
then, reading Christopher Hitchens’s 
Why Orwell Matters or perhaps David 
Reynolds’s In Command of History, a 
fascinating story of Churchill’s produc-
tion of his memoir The Second World 
War and a sure testament to the 
fact that those who win wars get to 
write the history� Regardless, this is 
a fine book for anyone interested in 
reacquainting themselves with either 
luminary, or for those curious to see 
both in a complementary light�
CHRISTOPHER NELSON
The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought, 
by Lukas Milevski� Oxford, U�K�: Oxford Univ� 
Press, 2016� 175 pages� $80�
At first glance, telling the story of the 
evolution of grand strategy would seem 
to be a straightforward project� The term 
grand strategy is encountered often in a 
variety of disciplines, each of which at-
taches importance to the idea� However, 
as Lukas Milevski demonstrates, the task 
is far more challenging than it appears�
The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic 
Thought is essentially Milveski’s doctoral 
dissertation� It is not a book especially 
suited to the lay reader� Milevski is 
thorough in this effort—he does not 
appear to have overlooked anyone of 
importance� Milevski explains that 
one of the major difficulties associ-
ated with grand strategic thought is a 
notable lack of a commonly agreed-upon 
definition of the term� He identifies six 
interpretations of the term in current 
use, of which five are associated with 
particular scholars and each of which 
presumably has passionate adherents� 
It is easy to imagine how Milevski 
must have felt as, in his own words, he 
began his doctoral research “believing 
I knew what a grand strategy was and 
how I would use the concept,” only to 
discover that “there were simply too 
many distinct and even contradictory 
definitions of grand strategy” (p� 1)�
The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic 
Thought takes a chronological approach 
to the subject, and explains how the con-
text of the times affected contemporary 
thinking on grand strategy� Divided into 
eight chapters, the work starts during 
the Napoleonic Wars, anchoring grand 
strategy’s origin as a military concept, 
as “interpreted” by Carl von Clausewitz 
and Baron Antoine-Henri de Jomini�
Those privileged to work within the halls 
of the Naval War College and its Royal 
Navy counterpart will not be surprised 
to find that great maritime strategists, 
notably Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian 
Corbett, deserve places of prominence 
as theorists of grand strategy� Milevski 
reminds the reader that Stephen B� 
Luce brought Mahan to the Naval War 
College to teach strategy; however, as the 
College initially lacked students, Mahan 
had almost three years to refine this 
thinking before giving his first lecture� 
In comparing these two great naval strat-
egists, Milevski identifies Mahan as the 
more influential, but considers Corbett 
superior as a thinker on grand strategy�
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The period bookended between the first 
days of World War I and the last days of 
World War II was productive for grand 
strategists� Milevski details the rise of 
J� F� C� Fuller and Basil H� Liddell Hart, 
rightly described as “giants of British 
strategic thought�” Also discussed are the 
works of other strategists, notably Henry 
Antony Sargeaunt and Geoffrey West� 
The shadow of the First World War 
looms heavily over this portion of the 
book, and Milevski does an admirable 
job of showing how the war influenced 
the thinking of these strategists� Each 
was determined to avoid the horrors 
of the trenches and the near-fatal 
blows dealt winners and losers alike�
Milevski explains how postwar thinking 
about grand strategy took a different 
direction in the United States� Edward 
Mead Earle was a rising strategist, as 
was Captain George Meyers, USN, who 
lectured on strategy at the Naval War 
College� Not since Mahan had U�S� 
strategists engaged in “such serious, 
in depth development” of the grand 
strategic concept� Central to their work 
was a perceived need to link military 
ends to political results� Ironically, much 
of this thinking would be discarded after 
the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki ushered in the age of nuclear 
strategy� Milevski argues that scholars 
forgot the “notion” of grand strategy as 
their attention focused on nuclear strate-
gy and limited-war theory� During these 
discussions, more names joined the list 
of scholars dealing with grand strategy, 
including John Gaddis, Bernard Brodie, 
Henry Kissinger, and Herman Kahn�
Milevski states that during this period 
limited-war theory came into existence; 
prior to this, national power was used 
to prevent or win wars� During this 
time, Milevski credits the Naval War 
College with serving as the center of 
what little study on grand strategy was 
undertaken� Milevski explains this 
phenomenon by noting that nuclear 
strategy protected and preserved the 
Air Force, while limited-war strategy 
served a similar function for the Army� 
Lacking such intellectual cover, the 
Navy stayed focused on grand strategy�
Grand strategic thought reemerged in 
the 1970s in the wake of the Vietnam 
War� New academics took up the study 
of grand strategy; Milevski identifies 
John M� Collins, Edward N� Luttwak, 
and Barry R� Posen� Paul M� Kennedy 
gets credit for building on Liddell Hart’s 
work, and Luttwak’s work is noted as 
being similar to Earle’s, in that Luttwak’s 
ideas of grand strategy are “effectively 
synonymous with military statecraft�” In 
contrast, Posen’s view of grand strategy, 
according to Milevski, focuses on “relat-
ing military ends to political means�”
In addition to discussing the major 
definitions of grand strategy, Milevski 
also has included unique applications� 
Here too the Naval War College 
contributed to the field� Historian 
John B� Hattendorf broke ground in 
using grand strategy as an analytical 
tool� The late William C� Martel, who 
taught at both the Fletcher School of 
Law and Diplomacy and the Naval War 
College, turned the strategy-policy 
relationship—“one of the core concerns 
of strategic studies”—on its head�
In the end, Milevski concludes, “Grand 
strategy remains a standardless, incoher-
ent concept” (p� 141)� Its interpretations 
and explanations have been author-
centric, and instances of scholars such 
as Collins and Kennedy being willing to 
refer to earlier definitions of the term 
are rare� Despite the decades of study, 
there is still no common definition of 
the term, and new definitions continue 
to multiply� At present, according to 
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Milevski, the state of grand strategic 
thinking is “unhelpful” and requires 
“rehabilitation” before that state can 
change� To say that this conclusion is 
surprising is something of an under-
statement, and it will be interesting to 
see how many scholars of grand strategy 
agree with Milevski in this regard�
RICHARD J� NORTON
A Handful of Bullets: How the Murder of Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand Still Menaces the Peace, by Har-
lan K� Ullman� Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 2014� 214 pages� $34�95�
The legacies of the First World War 
are many, and Harlan K� Ullman, a 
respected national security practitioner 
and academic, offers a thought-
provoking snapshot of some of the 
current challenges facing the United 
States that can be linked back to the 
war� The book focuses on current policy 
debates, but simultaneously attempts 
to relate back to historical events� 
Ullman argues that the current threat 
environment began revealing itself 
when Gavrilo Princip assassinated the 
archduke of Austria, thus launching the 
First World War with only a handful of 
bullets� Today, Ullman contends that 
there are all kinds of Gavrilo Princips in 
the world who can throw international 
order into a tailspin� More significantly, 
the author argues that the means and 
methods of doing so have multiplied�
Ullman’s foundational argument is that 
individuals and groups now can have 
increased impact vis-à-vis the state� This 
change occurred because of the gradual 
unraveling of the Westphalian system 
and the erosion of state sovereignty 
over the last decades� Power is now 
diffused among so many people and 
devices that they cannot be quantified� 
The consequence is a world with “four 
new horsemen of the apocalypse”: 
failed governments; economic despair, 
disparity, and dislocation; radical 
ideologies; and environmental calam-
ity� These represent the main threats 
on which the United States should 
focus, but unfortunately our policy is 
grounded in the past, and our present 
strategies address the symptoms instead 
of the causes of these threats� This new 
environment is difficult for governments 
to manage; the United States in particu-
lar does not have a system in place that 
enables it to cope� Ullman argues that 
our political-military system merely 
hops back and forth from one crisis 
to the next without any real strategy�
The author argues that the United States 
desperately needs sounder strategic 
thinking� The extent of the national 
debt means that resources for project-
ing military power will be more and 
more limited� When a state’s chief 
enemies possess no organized military 
or economic base, traditional military 
power exerts less influence� The United 
States must become smarter in spending 
for national defense and must formulate 
strategies that take into account not 
just Iran, China, and Al Qaeda but all 
the overarching challenges it faces, as 
well as the wild card scenarios that 
can emanate from them� However, the 
author keenly observes that this strategic 
change is unlikely to occur, given the 
dysfunction and vitriol in our political 
system� Our elected leaders have a 
short-term obsession with winning 
elections and with the continuous 
pursuit of dollars for campaign financ-
ing� As many others surely would agree, 
Ullman worries that only major crises 
can create the impetus for real change�
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